V. EU involvement and the Migration Pact on the Ground: Serbia

Trigger Warning: This blog contains details of police violence and brutality.

On 12 June 2026, the European Union's New Pact on Migration and Asylum will begin to take effect across Member States. EU institutions have presented the Pact as a long-awaited solution to Europe's fragmented asylum system: a framework with a triple focus designed to improve efficiency, strengthen border management, and create greater coordination between states.

But for organisations working along the Balkan Route, the Pact raises a different question: How will these reforms ensure protection for people escaping conflict, persecution or economic insecurity? People on the move face greater risk of human rights violations across Europe – including illegal and violent pushbacks, arbitrary detention and discriminatory policing.

What will happen to the countries beyond the EU's borders that are already carrying the consequences of Europe's migration policies?

At Collective Aid, our work is grounded in what we see and hear directly from people on the move. Over the past year, we have documented the effects of increasingly securitised migration management across the Western Balkans: expanded border surveillance, intensified policing operations, shrinking humanitarian access, continued reports of pushbacks, and a growing reliance on anti-smuggling frameworks that often prioritise deterrence over protection.

The Pact Does Not Stop at the EU Border

Although Serbia is not a member of the European Union, it has become deeply embedded within the EU's migration governance architecture. As a candidate country, Serbia has historically aligned itself with selected EU policies and regulations as part of its accession ambitions, particularly in areas linked to security, border management, and migration. At the same time, progress on democratic reforms, rule of law, and human rights protections has often lagged behind. In this sense, Serbia's relationship with EU migration policy extends far beyond simple geographic proximity.

Serbia occupies a unique position along the Balkan Route. Situated at the EU's south-eastern periphery, it has increasingly been expected to act not only as a transit country but also as a partner in the management of migration towards the European Union. Existing cooperation mechanisms already include readmission agreements, border management partnerships, visa alignment requirements, anti-smuggling initiatives, and accession-related policy harmonisation. The EU's Western Balkans Action Plan and the expansion of Frontex operations in Serbia are recent examples of this trend.

The Action Plan on the Western Balkans identifies 20 operational measures structured along 5 pillars:

“(1) strengthening border management along the routes; (2) swift asylum procedures and support reception capacity; (3) fighting migrant smuggling; (4) enhancing readmission cooperation and returns as well as (5) achieving visa policy alignment. The measures are focused on support to or actions by Western Balkan partners, and action in the EU. It aims to strengthen the cooperation on migration and border management with partners in Western Balkans in light of their unique status with EU accession perspective and their continued efforts to align with EU rules”.

Migration governance across the Western Balkans has consequently become increasingly aligned with EU priorities. This has included expanded border surveillance, strengthened policing operations, enhanced information-sharing systems, and growing investments in anti-smuggling frameworks. While these measures are frequently presented as necessary tools for migration management, they have coincided with continued reports of pushbacks, shrinking humanitarian access, and increasing barriers to protection throughout the region.

The Pact's implications for Serbia therefore stem not from EU membership itself, but from Serbia's growing role within a broader system of European migration governance. Although Serbia will not formally implement the Pact, many of its core objectives, preventing onward movement, accelerating returns, strengthening border procedures, and expanding enforcement cooperation, are likely to be reflected through existing partnerships between the EU and Western Balkan states.

This matters because migration policies do not stop at the EU's borders. The consequences of European asylum reforms are often felt far beyond them. When access to protection becomes more restricted inside the EU, people do not simply stop moving. Instead, journeys become longer, more dangerous, and increasingly hidden. Routes shift. Reliance on informal networks grows. Humanitarian actors encounter greater barriers to providing support. The risks associated with exploitation, violence, detention, and disappearance increase. 

Understanding the Pact's impact on Serbia therefore requires looking beyond the territory of the European Union itself. Increasingly, migration governance is taking place outside EU borders through a network of partnerships, funding mechanisms, enforcement cooperation, and political conditionality. As the Pact enters into force, these dynamics are likely to intensify.

From Transit to Containment - What political role is Serbia being pushed into?

Serbia has historically functioned as a buffer zone on Europe’s south-eastern periphery, a ‘bulwark’ of Europe. This role is not new, but it has taken different forms over time, shaped by shifting borders, empires, and more recently, EU enlargement and migration governance.

In an analysis provided by Belgrade’s InfoPark to Statewatch, the idea was raised that the Pact may accelerate a transformation already underway, namely Serbia shifting from a transit country into a containment space.

Historically, Serbia has been a transit state. People moved through Serbia towards EU destinations. This is still reflected in institutional reporting and operational data, including UNHCR and EUAA assessments of the Western Balkan Route, which consistently describe Serbia as a transit corridor rather than a destination country.

Reception systems were designed around onward movement. Camp structures, registration processes, and humanitarian provision were largely oriented toward short-term stay, emergency support, and preparation for continued travel rather than long-term settlement or containment.

However, the Pact signals a changing logic of migration management. There is less emphasis on access to asylum, particularly through expanded border procedures and accelerated processing at or near EU external borders, which risk limiting meaningful access to protection for people arriving irregularly.

There is also more emphasis on preventing onward movement, including strengthened return procedures, expanded readmission cooperation, and increased pressure on third countries to ensure that people do not move beyond designated points of registration or reception.

Here, ‘containment’ in Serbia’s case does not inherently mean detention, but delayed movement, waiting, bottlenecks, and a general increased pressure to remain in transit countries. It also increasingly reflects a system in which people are not formally held in place, but are effectively immobilised through administrative uncertainty, shifting eligibility criteria, restricted access to services, and increasingly restrictive border enforcement practices that reduce available routes.

Thus, Serbia is increasingly expected to manage populations rather than facilitate movement.

Returns, Safe Third Countries, and the Risk of Stranding People in Serbia

Other than the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, the EU Commission has also proposed a Return Regulation, which builds on the Asylum Procedures Regulation by expanding what they deem as ‘safe countries of origin’, introducing more ‘flexible’ connection criteria, and creating return hubs. According to Swedish MEP Charlie Weimers, the “era of deportations has begun”.

Through the Pact, detention and freedom of movement are increasingly blurred. Screening and border procedures allow for the detention of people while formally categorising it as a “restriction of movement”. In effect, this creates spaces that operate as de facto detention without being explicitly labelled as such. The Pact’s return mechanisms may in effect put pressure on Serbia to absorb people who cannot continue onward, particularly those whose asylum claims are rejected under accelerated or border procedures within the EU.

In Preševo camp - a former tobacco factory repurposed into a reception centre - conditions reflect the long-term consequences of short-term infrastructure. The centre was not designed for sustained accommodation, yet continues to host people for prolonged periods. During field visits, we observed limited access to services, deteriorating facilities, and restricted, criminalised conditions for those residing there. What was originally framed as emergency reception has, over time, become a securitised, semi-permanent containment without adequate adaptation of infrastructure or support systems.

This does not signal a truly coordinated effort in achieving greater protection for people on the move, but rather resembles more administration and governance. Return counselling and so-called “voluntary” return programmes are likely to be expanded further under the Pact framework, probably introduced at early stages of the asylum or reception process and inherently tied to a “duty to cooperate” with return procedures. Without corresponding safeguarding and protection of people’s rights, these mechanisms risk becoming procedural exercises rather than sustainable, socially-responsible, meaningful, rights-based processes.

A key pillar of the Pact is the expansion and formalisation of “safe third country” concepts. These frameworks allow EU Member States to declare that individuals can be returned or redirected to countries deemed “safe” for asylum processing, even where protection standards fall short or access to asylum procedures is limited in practice. Being presented as a tool to increase efficiency in the ‘harmonisation’ of asylum processing, this will inevitably shift responsibility beyond EU territory, increasing reliance on neighbouring states such as Serbia. The recent agreement between Italy and Albania to establish two new ‘deportation hubs’ shows that similar agreements can take place between EU-members (or the UK) and other Western Balkan states. 

Human Rights Watch has documented serious human rights violations in every country on the EU’s “safe countries of origin” list: Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco, Tunisia, and EU candidate countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia - and importantly Serbia

This is closely linked to existing readmission agreements between Serbia and the EU, which already facilitate the return of individuals under certain conditions. The Pact risks expanding both the scope and the frequency of such returns, while further embedding Serbia within a broader system of return and containment governance.

This therefore creates a growing risk of people being stranded in Serbia. Many will be unable to move forward due to increased border restrictions and externalised EU asylum procedures. The result is an expanding population living in long-term uncertainty, caught between blocked onward movement and limited options, with few viable pathways to stability or resolution.

Returns and containment, in this context, will not provide a sustainable solution but instead signals a dangerous step towards offshore detention.

Surveillance, Border Technology, and EU-Funded Enforcement

In recent years, a growing proportion of EU support (pre-accession funding) has been directed towards strengthening border management capacities, including the procurement of surveillance technologies, biometric systems, and border monitoring infrastructure.

Between 2024 and 2026, a series of EU-funded procurement processes were launched through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III), including tenders for drones, motion-sensor vehicles, fixed surveillance systems, and other border-monitoring technologies. Beyond these procurements, Serbia has also benefited from funding allocated under the Western Balkans Action Plan, which includes support for biometric databases, night-vision equipment, video surveillance systems, and other detection technologies.

These developments are occurring alongside a significant expansion of Frontex cooperation. In June 2024, Serbia and the EU signed a new operational agreement allowing Frontex deployments throughout Serbian territory, including at borders with non-EU countries. Just this month Serbia and Frontex signed a Partnership Academy Agreement, giving Serbian border guards access to Frontex workshops, courses, common projects, exchange and mobility programmes and eLearning, with the aim of strengthening common educational standards and supporting the modernisation of border and coast guard training. This represents a notable shift in the geography of European border management. Increasingly, migration control and securitisation is not taking place solely at the EU's external border, but deeper within neighbouring states through operational partnerships, intelligence sharing, and joint enforcement activities.

At the same time, anti-smuggling initiatives such as EU4FAST are expanding the role of security-focused responses within migration governance. While framed as efforts to combat organised crime and trafficking, these programmes contribute to a broader architecture of monitoring, detection, and intervention that prioritises identifying and intercepting movement. Raids have thus and will continue to occur, such as one this month even involving Serbia’s gendarmerie. While targeting trafficking and smuggling networks is important, enforcement-led responses alone seldom address the conditions that make people reliant on such networks in the first place, and may instead increase vulnerability by driving movement into less visible and more precarious routes. 

For example, in May 2026 the Hungarian government announced an upgrade to Serbian Border Security with an EU-Funded Electronic System. With support from the European Union, the new system will implement significant technical and infrastructural improvements along the Schengen external border section between Hungary and Serbia. As part of the project, an integrated mobile telecommunications network is being established to ensure “the fast and reliable transmission of data from surveillance devices operating along the border”. The investment is being implemented with 7.639 billion forints (19.64 million euros) in EU funding, co-financed by the government.

Our own field monitoring suggests that these technologies are already shaping the lived experiences of people on the move. Between 2024 and 2026, we documented numerous incidents in which individuals reported being detected or tracked through drones, thermal cameras, biometric systems, and other surveillance technologies. In several cases, reports of drone detection were followed by police interception and allegations of violence or pushbacks. 

Consequently, as part of Collective Aid’s participation in Border Violence Monitoring Network’s testimony framework, through 2026 we continued to bear witness to testimonies from people on the move - particularly from Presevo - about their experiences of violent pushbacks from Hungarian police at the Serbia-Hungary border. One man provided us with a testimony, who reported being beaten and kicked by Hungarian police near Röszke, Hungary. He was threatened by a gun, was humiliated, experiencing verbal abuse, denial of water, and theft. He was with a group of six - including women. It was reported that a police officer kicked a pregnant woman in the stomach, causing her to bleed. 

Hungarian police were parked watching us this day, aligning with recent statements detailing Hungarian police participation in the Western Balkan border control, continuing in joint border operations. New units of the Hungarian police left Budapest at the end of May for Bulgaria and Serbia in order to further police borders in those two countries. The Hungarian contingent is participating in joint service with 15 policemen in Serbia. 

In their statement, the Hungarian police stated that "During their service abroad, Hungarian police officers primarily work to prevent illegal border crossings, detect violations related to illegal migration, and fight human smuggling networks”. Their tasks include monitoring border areas. Additional police contingents have been deployed for Bulgaria and Serbia to support border protection duties. The implementation of the tasks will be supported by modern technical equipment, including field service vehicles, hand-held night vision devices, thermal cameras and mobile thermal camera systems.

This is particularly concerning with regards to accountability. The expansion of surveillance technologies and personnel is frequently justified as a neutral or technical response to migration management challenges. Yet these systems form part of a wider enforcement chain that determines detection, interception, prevention (of people moving onward), and who is ultimately exposed to return procedures or pushbacks - and even enabling those which are violent.

As the Pact enters into force, these trends are expected to accelerate. Namely, we are likely to witness an increasingly sophisticated infrastructure designed to monitor, classify, and control movement long before people reach the territory of the European Union.

What This Means for Humanitarian Access and Protection

As Serbia risks becoming a de facto containment zone, with the Pact deepening externalisation and accelerating returns, we are likely to see increased pressure on humanitarian actors alongside a strengthening of deterrence-oriented migration management across the Western Balkans.

For example, during a field visit to Preševo in Southern Serbia this month, our team was subject to police monitoring while distributing humanitarian aid. Hungarian police officers parked alongside our distribution vehicle, asked about our activities, and remained present for the duration of the distribution. This reflects an increasingly securitised migration environment in which humanitarian actors are operating alongside expanding enforcement structures.

As Stevan Tatalovic of InfoPark notes, “It is clear that civic space will be squeezed further. As cross-border, inter-governmental collaborations harden, documenting violations or operating shelters will be made more and more difficult just as medical, psychosocial, and child protection needs rise”.

This trend is particularly concerning because movement is unlikely to cease. Rather, it will become less visible. Anti-smuggling initiatives and intensified border enforcement may reduce the visibility of migration, but they do not eliminate the factors that drive people to move. Instead, they often push people towards more dangerous and hidden routes, increasing reliance on informal networks and exposing individuals to greater risks of exploitation and violence.

Our field observations point towards this. Most new arrivals entering Serbia through Bulgaria continue to report theft, police violence, detention, and pushbacks along the way. Other risks of dangerous routes include kidnappings and even gun violence.

This creates significant challenges for humanitarian organisations. As movement becomes more dispersed and less visible, it becomes harder to identify needs, provide assistance, monitor protection concerns, and document abuses. Yet the need for support remains substantial. In the first months of 2026 alone, Collective Aid reached 280 people across Serbia, distributing 1,457 essential non-food items, including clothing and hygiene products.

Ultimately, deterrence may reduce the visibility of migration, but it does not reduce vulnerability. Official numbers indicate that only 7 asylum cases were accepted in 2024, and a similar, single-digit number in 2025. If implementation of the Pact further restricts access to protection while expanding enforcement and return mechanisms, humanitarian needs are likely to grow rather than diminish. The result may be a migration landscape characterised not by fewer people on the move, but by greater precarity for those travelling through it and fewer opportunities to access support.

Conclusion: Movement will continue, but at greater risk. 

Last year we conducted research on just how deadly the Balkan Route is in our Dead and Missing report. The question that remains is not whether movement will stop, but how conditions under which this takes place will deteriorate, and who will be made to bear the cost. 

There is nothing humane or sustainable about a system that relies on deterrence, externalisation, and containment while reducing access to protection and pushing responsibility beyond EU borders.

As we have argued previously, civil society and grassroots actors continue to bear the weight of protection work, often without structural support or political space. While EU policymakers negotiate arrangements with third countries and strengthen borders, the people affected by these decisions remain silenced, stuck, or made even more vulnerable. The “border” is no longer a line, but a sprawling architecture of rejection and deterrence.

Border externalisation is not a neutral administrative tool. It is a political project that shifts risk away from states and onto people on the move. It cannot be resolved merely through greater monitoring or technical advancement. The incumbent policies of the Migration Pact are not designed with protection in mind: Real protection requires access to safe and legal pathways, accountability for violations, and a political commitment to rights over deterrence.

Until then, movement will continue, but under greater risk.

Words by Emilia Micunovic, advocacy officer in Serbia